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Abstract
In 1999 general assistance recipients in New York City were required to participate in a
job training and outplacement assistance program. Initially, recipients were enrolled in
‘waves’ due to capacity constraints. The program’s impact is identified using a quasiexperiment in which selectees are compared to concomitantly eligible non-selectees.
Selectees are 15 percentage points more likely to start a job and 10 percentage points
more likely to exit welfare than are non-selectees. This methodology is important since
random-assignment experiments can be costly and difficult to implement. Further,
experiments are not impervious to criticism; this procedure addresses three of five known
shortcomings.

* Santa Clara University, Department of Economics, 500 El Camino Real, Lucas 216B,
Santa Clara, CA, 95053, 408-554-5579 (phone), 408-554-2331 (fax), jifcher@scu.edu.

INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades U.S. welfare programs have been transformed. A
central objective of the reforms has been to help recipients move from welfare to work. In
response, a variety of ‘welfare-to-work’ programs have been implemented. They
typically include one or more of the following components: unpaid work experience,
classroom instruction, on-the-job training, financial incentives, and job search assistance.
A substantial literature has developed to identify the resulting changes in welfare
use, employment, well-being, and family structure [recent reviews include Blank, 2002;
Grogger and Karoly, 2005; Moffitt, 2003]. The results largely support the following two
conclusions: First, in the short run, at least, welfare-to-work programs had the intended
effect, reducing welfare use and increasing employment. Second, the most effective
welfare-to-work programs are those that include mandatory work requirements with an
emphasis on job placement [Grogger and Karoly, 2005].
These findings are largely derived from well-designed random-assignment
experiments. While such experiments are certainly an excellent method for identifying
the effect of a welfare-to-work program, they are not impervious to criticism. The
following five shortcomings have been identified and are summarized in Grogger and
Karoly [2005]: First, since experimental programs are often implemented by aboveaverage managers, it is unclear whether successful pilot programs can be expanded
without losses in effectiveness. Second, experiments miss some general equilibrium
effects. For example, whereas full-scale implementation of a welfare-to-work program
might crowd-out other job seekers or even subsequent program participants, a pilot
program might not. Third, the ‘message’ of the pilot program may cross-over from the
1

program group to the control group. Fourth, experiments that only include current welfare
recipients do not capture entry effects. That is, a welfare-to-work program may change
the attractiveness of receiving welfare and therefore not only effect the exit rate, but also
the entry rate. Finally, random-assignment experiments can be costly and hard to
implement.
The first four shortcomings are noteworthy since each could cause experimental
estimates to be biased. For example, the first presumably introduces a positive bias and
the third a negative bias. Thus, available estimates, which are largely based on
experimental evidence, are potentially biased with the direction and magnitude of the
overall bias unknown. Moreover, no new random-assignment experiments have been
conducted since the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA).1
A few non-experimental and quasi-experimental studies have explored the effect
of welfare-to-work programs. Two of these studies have challenged the claim that the
most effective welfare-to-work programs are those that emphasize rapid job placement
[Hotz et al, 2006; Dyke et al, 2006]. These authors find that more intensive training,
which emphasizes human capital development, generates larger positive effects. These
effects, however, take longer to emerge than do the effects of programs that emphasize
job placement.2
The paucity of non-experimental and quasi-experimental studies is largely due to
two factors. First, there has been a shortage of clever strategies (in the absence of
random-assignment) to identify the effects of welfare-to-work programs using
administrative data. Second, welfare-to-work programs vary along numerous dimensions,
2

making it difficult to parameterize the programs in a manner that is useful for
identification. Thus, data from nationally representative surveys has not been successfully
used to estimate the effect of welfare-to-work programs.3
In this paper, I demonstrate a quasi-experimental identification strategy to
estimate the effect of a welfare-to-work program. To do so, I take advantage of a quirk in
the program’s administration. Specifically, when the program was initiated, all eligible
General Assistance (GA) recipients could not participate concurrently due to capacity
constraints.4 Rather, GA recipients were selected for the program in ‘waves.’ The wave
enrollment process creates the opportunity to identify the effect of the program by
comparing ‘selectees,’ recipients who were selected on a given date to ‘non-selectees,’
recipients who were eligible, but not selected, on that date. The results indicate that the
program increased the likelihood that a recipient started a job by 15 percentage points and
increased the likelihood that a recipient exited welfare by 10 percentage points.
This quasi-experiment is similar to a random-assignment experiment in that it
enables one to estimate the effect of a welfare-to-work program. It also ameliorates three
of the five previously discussed shortcomings of random-assignment experiments. First,
the program was not a small-scale, pilot program implemented by above-average
managers. Rather, it was the principal welfare-to-work program for all welfare recipients
in New York City (NYC). Second, this analysis should capture general equilibrium
effects in the labor market given: (1) the size of program, over 10,000 GA recipients were
enrolled during the program’ first year, and (2) the number of welfare recipients who
started a job, over 100,000 recipients of Family Assistance (FA) and GA combined
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reported finding a job during the program’s first two years. Finally, this program was not
a costly, or difficult to implement, random-assignment experiment.
The next section of this paper presents an overview of welfare reform in NYC.
The third section describes the quasi-experimental identification strategy. The fourth
section discusses the empirical implementation. The fifth section presents the results. The
sixth section describes a robustness check that was performed. The final section discusses
the findings and presents a brief fiscal cost benefit analysis.
WELFARE REFORM IN NYC
In 1994, Rudolph Giuliani, newly elected mayor of NYC, made reforming the
City’s welfare programs a priority. At the time, NYC had over one million welfare
recipients, including almost 300,000 GA recipients. The City was spending
approximately three billion dollars annually on welfare programs, including one billion
dollars on GA.
In 1995, NYC initiated the Work, Accountability, and You (NYCWAY) program.
A central tenet of NYCWAY was that able-bodied welfare recipients were required to
work in exchange for their benefits.5 Almost all recipients fulfilled this requirement by
participating in a Work Experience Program (WEP) assignment 21 hours per week.6 The
majority of WEP participants worked outdoors removing litter, weeds, and graffiti from
parks, vacant lots, streets, and highways. Over the next six years, the number of welfare
recipients in NYC declined by more than 50% and the number of GA recipients declined
by 70%.
In 1999, NYC created the Employment Services and Placement Program (ESPP),
a job training and outplacement assistance program. With the implementation of the
4

ESPP, welfare recipients were required to participate in a WEP assignment three days a
week and in the ESPP two days a week. This increased, from 21 to 35, the number of
hours per week that recipients were required to spend in structured activities.
Eleven private contractors were hired to provide ESPP services. All had a history
of providing social services in NYC. The contractors were paid on a performance basis.
They received a substantial payment for each recipient they placed in a job; the average
payment was approximately $3,000. The contractors focused on developing participants’
‘soft skills’ including résumé writing and interview techniques, and helped participants
arrange job interviews. ESPP contractors were required to attempt to place each
participant for at least six weeks.
Prior to implementation, there were over 10,000 GA recipients who were eligible
for the ESPP. To be eligible, a GA recipient had to be participating in a WEP assignment
and job-ready.7 Since all eligible GA recipients could not be accommodated
simultaneously, recipients were enrolled in waves. Selectees were informed by mail of
their status, instructed to report to the proper location at a prescribed date and time (the
program start date was typically two weeks after the selection date), and advised that they
would be sanctioned if they failed to comply with the program’s requirements. New
waves were formed every two weeks until each eligible GA recipient was selected or had
become ineligible.
Recipients were selected for each wave centrally by computer programmers. The
selection process did not include intake interviews or objective assessments. The
intention was to generate a random sample of selectees for each wave stratified by
borough. In the fourth section, I report that the selection process did not approximate a
5

random one and discuss the attendant adjustments that are made to the estimates
presented in this paper.
QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY
Generally, to identify the effect of a program one compares the outcomes of
treated and untreated individuals. In the case of the ESPP, recipients who remained
eligible should have ultimately been treated. Thus, recipients who remained untreated
must have become ineligible prior to being selected for the ESPP and do not make a valid
comparison group.8
An Alternative Approach to Identify the Effect of the ESPP
It is possible, however, to estimate the effect of the ESPP taking advantage of the
wave enrollment process. To do so, I compare all selectees from a given wave to all ‘nonselectees,’ recipients who were eligible but not selected, for the same wave. By
performing this comparison for each of the first 17 waves, and combining all selectees
into one group, the program group, and all non-selectees into another group, the control
group (see Figure 1), I can estimate the Program Effect (PE).9 Specifically, the PE is
defined as,
E[Yi ( Pi = 1)] − E[Yi ( Pi = 0)]
M

M

(1)

where Yi M ( Pi ) is an indicator function which equals one if individual i started a job

within M months of his or her inclusion in the program or control group and zero
otherwise, and is a function of whether recipient i was a member of the program group,
Pi=1, or the control group, Pi=0. <<Figure 1 here>>
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All selectees are placed in the program group, and considered treated, regardless
of whether or not they participated in the ESPP. This even includes recipients who failed
to attend the ESPP orientation. Hence the PE is an ‘Intent to Treat’ (IT) effect and should
not suffer from self-selection bias.10 Members of the program group remain in the
program group for the remainder of the study; that is, there is no program group attrition.
Further, this identification strategy does not suffer from control group attrition.
Each member of the control group remains in the control group for the remainder of the
study. For example, control group members who subsequently were selected, and or
exited welfare, remain in the control group.
On the other hand, the identification strategy does suffer from control group
contamination. Over 70% of control group members were selected for the ESPP
subsequent to their inclusion therein. Consequently, the PE is negatively biased and a
conservative estimate of the program’s true effect.
Adjusting for Control Group Contamination

To adjust for control group contamination, a set of additional, restricted control
groups is created in which recipients are removed from the control group if they were
selected within a given number of waves of their inclusion in the control group. For
example, a control group with a one-wave restriction on being selected is created by
removing members of the original control group if they were selected in the subsequent
wave. So, a non-selectee from the first wave, who was a selectee for the second wave,
would be excluded from this restricted control group.
It is important to note that the original control group includes two distinct cohorts:
(1) non-selectees who remained eligible and were ultimately selected, and (2) non7

selectees who became ineligible prior to being selected. This distinction is important
because all members of the original control group who are removed to form the restricted
control groups must have remained eligible (since they were selected). That is, they must
have been in the first cohort. For the restricted control group to be a valid comparison
group for the program group, the ratio of members of cohort one to members of cohort
two must be the same in the restricted control group as in the original control group.
Accordingly, the weight placed on members of the first cohort in the restricted control
group is increased. Specifically, the weight is the reciprocal of the probability that
members of cohort one were not selected for the subsequent wave (see Figure 2).
<<Figure 2 here>>
I utilize the above procedure recursively to create control groups with up to a
thirty-wave restriction on being selected. Imposing longer restrictions produces very
large weights that could cause unstable estimates. For example, the maximum weight is
286 when a thirty-two-wave restriction on being selected is imposed. In this paper, I use
the initial, unrestricted control group, denoted control group: no restriction, and control
groups that restrict being selected for an even number of waves. Thus, the restricted
control groups have a one-month, two-month, three-month, …, or fifteen-month
restriction on being selected (assuming that each month contains two-waves, or twentyeight days). They are denoted control group: 1M restriction, control group: 2M
restriction, control group: 3M restriction, …., and control group: 15M restriction,

respectively.
EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION
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With NYC’s permission, the data for this study were extracted from an
administrative database. The case history and available demographic characteristics were
compiled for each eligible GA recipient. It should be noted that NYC only collected basic
demographic information, such as race, gender, and date of birth, for each welfare
recipient. No additional information is available.
The program and control groups were formed as described in the prior section. Of
all selectees and non-selectees (n = 64,800), just over half are men and about 90 percent
are nonwhite. Their average age is 47 and they are likely to live in the Bronx, Brooklyn,
or Manhattan (see Table 1). Comparing members of the program group (n = 6,782) and
control group (n = 58,018), one observes that the average age, years on welfare, and
gender and racial distributions appear similar. A difference of means test, however,
reveals that only the gender distribution is not significantly different. The distribution of
borough of residence is disparate as well. This is presumably the result of stratifying the
selection by borough. <<Table 1 here>>
Selection Process Was Not Random

Given the results of the difference of means tests discussed above, it is unlikely
that the selection process approximated a random one. To confirm this impression, I test
whether recipients’ demographic characteristics significantly impact the probability of
being selected. Specifically, the following probit equation is estimated,
C

P[ Pi wb = 1] = F (α wb + ∑ λcwb xicwb + ε iwb )

(2)

c =1

where Pi wb is a program group dummy that equals one if individual i was a selectee and
zero if individual i was a non-selectee in wave w and borough b; and xicwb is a series of C
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demographic characteristics for individual i in wave w and borough b. To decrease the
chance of generating spurious results, equation (2) is only estimated for the three largest
waves in each of the four largest boroughs; the number of selectees per borough varied
widely across waves.
The coefficients on age, and years continuously on welfare, provide strong
evidence that the selection process was not random. Six of twelve coefficients on age,
and seven of twelve coefficients on years continuously on welfare, are positive and
significantly different than zero (see Table 2). Thus, the probability of being selected
increased with age and welfare tenure.11 For the other demographic characteristics there
was no discernable selection pattern. <<Table 2 here>>
One thing is certain though; eligible recipients were selected solely using
information that was stored in the administrative database. The selection process was
centralized and conducted by computer programmers. Individual caseworkers were not
involved in any manner. No intake interviews or objective assessments were conducted
prior to selection. In other words, the selection process was conducted without human
discretion. Such a selection process, even if it did not approximate a random one, should
not disturb the necessary assumption that there was no systematic selection on
unobserved characteristics. Consequently, by including covariates in the analysis, one
should be able to adjust for the observed differences.
Adjusting for observed characteristics

Since recipients who were older, and who had longer welfare spells, should have
been less likely to start a job and or exit welfare, the PE as defined in equation (1) is
potentially negatively biased. To adjust for the observed differences, a program dummy
10

and a series of observed characteristics are regressed on an outcome dummy.
Specifically, the following equation is estimated,
C

5

17

c =1

j =1

k =1

5

17

y iM = α M + β M Pi + ∑ λ cM x ic + ∑ δ jM Bij + ∑ γ kM Wik + ∑ ∑ η Mjk ( Bij * Wik ) + ε iM

(3)

j =1 k =1

where yiM is an outcome dummy that equals one if individual i started a job within M
months of being a selectee or non-selectee, and zero otherwise; Pi is a program group
dummy that equals one if individual i was in the program group and zero if individual i
was in the control group; x ic is a series of C demographic characteristics for individual i
at the time that he or she became a selectee or non-selectee; Bij is a borough dummy that
equals one if individual i resides in borough j and zero otherwise; and Wik is a wave
dummy that equals one if individual i was a selectee or non-selectee in wave k and zero
otherwise. Equation (3) is estimated using OLS for values of M between 0.5 and 26.12
RESULTS

Estimating equation (3), one finds that the PE first increases in M, and then after
peaking, decreases in M, as control group contamination increases (see Figure 3). The
peak PE is positive and significantly different than zero using each control group. The
magnitude of the peak PE increases – as well as the number of months required to reach
it – as the length of the restriction on being selected increases. For example, the peak PE
is 0.075 (t = 19.8, p = 0) when M = 4, 0.131 (t = 16.2, p = 0) when M = 8, and 0.152 (t =
12.7, p = 0) when M = 11.5 using control groups: no restriction, 6M, and 12M
restriction, respectively. <<Figure 3 here>>
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Further, the PEs using control group: 1M restriction are everywhere below the
PEs using control group: 2M restriction when M > 2. The former do not diverge from the
latter until the former’s one-month restriction on being selected expires. This pattern is
easy to observe in Figure 4a, which presents the PEs using the first four restricted control
groups only. Figure 4a also reveals that the pattern recurs when one compares the PEs
using control groups: 2M and 3M restriction, and control groups: 3M and 4M restriction.
In fact, this pattern is present using each control group between control groups: 1M and
12M restriction. After that, it stops. The peak PEs, and the PEs in the vicinity of the peak,

are quite similar using control groups: 12M, 13M, 14M, and 15M restriction (see Figure
4b). That is, further correction for control group contamination (beyond a twelve-month
restriction on being selected) does not significantly increase the peak PE. Moreover, the
peak PE using control group: 14M restriction is slightly larger than is the peak PE using
control group: 15M restriction (0.158 versus 0.155). Thus, the ESPP appears to increase

the likelihood of starting a job by approximately 15 percentage points. <<Figure 4 here>>
This employment effect appears to persist. Comparing the post-peak PEs using
control groups: 12M, 13M, 14M, and 15M restriction, one observes that the longer the

restriction, the more months it takes for a consistent post-peak decline to begin. For each
of these control groups, a consistent post-peak decline begins only after the restriction on
being selected has ended. For example, the PEs using control group: 12M restriction
begin to consistently decrease in M when M > 12. This pattern is easy to observe in
Figure 4b, which presents the PEs using the four most restricted control groups only.
Thus, the PEs using control group: 15M restriction provides a good estimate of the
impact of the ESPP for at least fifteen months post selection.
12

The employment effect is presumably not the result of the underlying economic
conditions, since including borough and wave dummies as well as the interaction term
should control for any macroeconomic shocks that may have occurred during the study
period. Further, prematurely terminating the study period on September 11th, 2001 does
not materially affect the findings; after September 11th, the unemployment rate increased
by over two percentage points in NYC.
Estimating equation (3) without covariates, one finds that the PEs decline. For
example, the PEs decrease by an average of 0.003 and 0.008 using control groups: 6M
and 12M restriction, respectively (see Figure 5). These declines are not statistically
significant. Further, they were expected. Recall that the probability of being selected for
the ESPP was greater for recipients who were older and had longer welfare spells. Such
recipients were assumed to be less likely to have started a job. Additional support for this
assumption can be found in the coefficients on age, which are negative and significantly
different than zero for all values of M (see Table 3). <<Figure 5 here>> <<Table 3
here>>
Starting a job is not the sole outcome by which the ESPP should be evaluated. For
the ESPP to be considered a true success, it should have also increased the probability
that recipients exited welfare after starting a job.13 Specifically, equation (3) is estimated
with y iM redefined as an outcome dummy that equals one if individual i started a job and
exited welfare for a six-month period within M months of becoming a selectee or nonselectee, and zero otherwise.14
The resulting PEs are similar in many respects to the previously estimated PEs.
Again,
13

•

the PE first increases in M, and then peaks (after peaking, however, it does not
substantially decrease in M);

•

the peak PE is positive and significantly different than zero using each control
group;

•

the magnitude of the peak PE increases as the length of the restriction increases;
and

•

the PEs estimated using less restricted control groups are everywhere below the
PEs estimated using more restricted control groups after the formers’ restriction
on being selected expires.

The peak PE is 0.052 (t = 10.4, p = 0) when M = 18.5, 0.091 (t = 9.9, p = 0) when M =
17, and 0.111 (t = 9.6, p = 0) when M = 17 using control groups: no restriction, 6M, and
12M, respectively (see Figure 6). Thus, it appears that the ESPP increases the likelihood

that recipients start a job and exit welfare by approximately 11 percentage points.
<<Figure 6 here>>
ROBUSTNESS CHECK

One might be concerned that ‘starting a job’ is better observed for members of the
program group than for members of the control group.15 This is not likely since NYC set
the ambitious goal of moving 100,000 recipients from welfare to work in 2000. Thus, the
City had a strong incentive to accurately record each job that was found by a recipient.
Nevertheless, to rule out this possibility, I estimate the effect of the ESPP on recipients’
welfare use. The ESPP should have increased welfare exits, if it increased employment.
Specifically, equation (3) is estimated with yiM redefined as an outcome dummy that
equals one if individual i has exited welfare for a six-month period within M months of
becoming a selectee or non-selectee and zero otherwise.16

14

The resulting PEs are again similar in many respects to the PEs estimated using
the initial dependent variable (see Figure 7). Again,
•

the PE first increases in M, and then after peaking, decreases in M, as control
group contamination increases;

•

the peak PE is positive and significantly different than zero using each control
group;

•

the magnitude of the peak PE increases as the length of the restriction on being
selected increases; and

•

the PEs estimated using less restricted control groups are everywhere below the
PEs estimated using more restricted control groups after the formers’ restriction
on being selected expires.

The peak PE is 0.040 (t = 7.2, p = 0) when M = 8, 0.076 (t = 6.4, p = 0) when M = 13,
0.094 (t = 5.4, p = 0) when M = 13.5, and 0.103 (t = 4.8, p = 0) when M = 13.5 using
control groups: no restriction, 6M, 12M, and 15M, respectively. Thus, it appears that the

ESPP increases the likelihood that recipients exit welfare by approximately 10 percentage
points. <<Figure 7 here>>
DISCUSSION

The primary contribution of this paper is the development of a new quasiexperimental approach to identify the effect of a welfare-to-work program. This is
important for the following four reasons. First, random-assignment experiments are often
costly and difficult to implement. Second, random-assignment experiments are not
impervious to criticism. This quasi-experiment addresses three of five known
shortcomings. Third, this identification strategy can be used to estimate the effect of other
government programs that face capacity constraints. For example, the Section 8 program
is perpetually oversubscribed as are many high performing public schools (in districts
15

with school choice).17 Fourth, this identification strategy can be utilized ex post. In
contrast, random-assignment experiments need to be designed ex ante.
The quasi-experiment developed in this paper is not without its own
shortcomings. Most notably, control group contamination is an inescapable side effect of
the identification strategy. Even after adjusting for control group contamination to the
extent possible, one is only able to estimate short-term effects. In the long-run, the PE’s
negative bias returns after the restriction on being selected expires. This limitation, only
being able to estimate short-term effects, is not unique to this study. Most research
regarding welfare reform only makes uses a few years of follow-up data [Friedlander et
al, 1997].
Another unique aspect of this study is that it estimates the impact of a welfare-towork program on GA recipients; GA is virtually unstudied to date. Yet, GA programs
serve a large population of economically vulnerable individuals who should be of interest
to researchers. The ESPP appears to have had a persistent positive impact on GA
recipients in NYC. It increased the probability that they exited welfare and started a job
by 10 and 15 percentage points, respectively.18
Previous studies that estimated the effect of similar welfare-to-work programs –
those with mandatory work requirements and an emphasis on job placement – on FA
recipients found that welfare exits and employment increased by an average of 6 and 9
percentage points, respectively [Grogger and Karoly, 2005]. The ESPP’s effect on GA
recipients is somewhat larger than the above reported averages. Whether this difference is
due to the distinct population (GA versus FA recipients), the unique identification
strategy, or another factor is unclear.
16

This research also contributes to the literature by studying the effect of a welfareto-work program in NYC. Neither random-assignment experiments nor non-experimental
studies have focused on a welfare-to-work program there. Yet, 23 percent of all GA
recipients, and 7 percent of all FA recipients, lived in NYC in 1996. The only study that
focuses on the impact of welfare reform in NYC is Chernick and Reimers [2004]. This
study found that welfare use declined and earnings increased for ‘at risk’ individuals after
PWRORA.19 The authors acknowledged, however, that the observed changes could have
been caused by welfare reform, the robust economy, or another factor.
Finally, one should consider whether the benefits of the ESPP outweighed the
costs. Preferably, one would conduct a comprehensive Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) as
was done in Orr et al [1996]. Unfortunately, such a CBA is not possible due to missing
data. Specifically, recipients’ earnings are not available. Increased earnings are the
primary benefit of a training program for an enrollee.
It is possible, however, to conduct a rough fiscal CBA. The primary cost for the
government were the fees paid to the ESPP contractors. The average fee was $3,000 per
placement. Some placed selectees, however, would have found a job without the help of
an ESPP contractor. Thus, we need to determine the cost of a ‘new’ placement, one that
would not have occurred without the ESPP. To do so, consider that approximately 35
percent of selectees started a job during the study period and that the ESPP’s employment
effect was approximately 15 percentage points, thus NYC had to pay for 35 placements
to generate 15 new placements. Consequently, the cost of a new placement was
approximately $7,000 (= $3,000 × (35 ÷ 15)).

17

The primary benefit for the government was a reduction in GA benefits. In early
2000, a typical GA recipient received $350 per month, or $4,200 annually. Thus, the
average selectee had to remain off welfare for 1.66 years (= $7,000 ÷ 4,200) for the
primary fiscal benefit to outweigh the primary fiscal cost. There is not enough post
selection data, unfortunately, to determine whether this is the case.20 However, at the end
of the study period, over two-thirds of the selectees who started a job were still off
welfare. These recipients had already been off welfare for a year, on average. Projecting
into the future, if one assumes that one-third of the selectees who started a job, and who
were still off welfare at the end of the study, returned to welfare in each of the three
subsequent years, then the primary fiscal benefits would surpass the primary fiscal costs.
Further, there are numerous additional fiscal benefits, for example, decreased
expenditures on Food Stamps or Medicaid, and few additional fiscal costs; data regarding
these additional fiscal benefits are not available. Thus, it appears likely that the ESPP
would pass a fiscal CBA.
NOTES

I wish to thank Alan Auerbach, David Card, Ken Chay, Swati Desai, Nada Eissa, Guido
Imbens, John Quigley, Steve Raphael, Emmanuel Saez, and three anonymous referees for
their help suggestions. I also wish to thank the Burch Center at the University of
California, Berkeley for its generous support and the New York City Human Resources
Administration for making the data available and funding a portion of this work. All
findings and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the author.
1

Prior to passage of the PRWORA in 1996, states could receive a ‘waiver,’ permission

from the federal government, to implement pilot welfare-to-work programs for a portion
18

of their Aid to Families with Dependent Children caseload. As a condition of receiving
the waiver, the state had to evaluate the pilot program using a random-assignment
experiment.
2

Also using a quasi-experimental approach, Autor and Houseman [2005] have

demonstrated that, unlike direct-hire jobs, temporary help jobs do not change the
likelihood that the recipients are employed one to two years post placement.
3

This is generally true for other components of welfare reform as well. One exception is

time limits. Using a non-experimental identification strategy, Grogger [2003]
demonstrates that time limits decrease welfare use.
4

GA is cash assistance for financially needy individuals who are not covered by

federally funded income maintenance programs.
5

Other components of NYCWAY included enhanced detection of welfare fraud,

increased substance abuse treatment, and diversion to federally funded disability
insurance where appropriate.
6

Participants received no compensation other than their welfare benefits and a nominal

stipend for carfare and lunch.
7

GA recipients were deemed job-ready if they did not have physical or emotional

barriers to employment. Private contractors were hired to evaluation recipients’ jobreadiness. Over 90 percent of GA recipients who were already participating in a WEP
assignment were found to be job-ready.
8

Becoming ineligible was not exogenous. Recipients could become ineligible by exiting

welfare or failing to comply with various program requirements.
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9

After 17 waves, 6,782 recipients had been selected, 953 remained eligible, and 3,791

had become ineligible.
10

In contrast, one could estimate the effect of participating in the ESPP, a ‘Treatment on

the Treated’ (TT) effect. To do so, one could multiply the IT effect by the inverse of the
fraction of selectees who received treatment – that is, participated in the ESPP [Orr,
1996, p. 107-108]. For the TT estimate to be unbiased the following assumption needs to
hold: The ‘threat’ of treatment cannot have an effect that is similar to the effect of the
treatment itself; otherwise, the TT estimate will be positively biased. This assumption is
unlikely to hold since the treatment is mandatory and costly for participants [Black et al,
2003]. IT and TT effects are further discussed in Katz, Kling, and Liebman [2001].
11

The computer programmers who conducted the selection process mistakenly believed

that sorting the list of eligible recipients by borough would cause each resulting borough
list to be randomly ordered. Thus they simply selected recipients from the top of these
lists.
12

This approach enables one to estimate a very general, non-parametric hazard rate.

Corrected standard errors are calculated by clustering the observations by individual. This
is necessary since some individuals appear in the dataset repeatedly. M = 26 is the
maximum number of months for which there is post selection data for each recipient.
Again, each month is assumed to have 28 days. So there are 26 M’s in two years.
13

It would have been interesting to study whether recipients remained employed.

However, NYC did not collect job retention data, and New York State was unwilling to
provide the unemployment insurance wage records for study participants. Thus, this

20

measure is used. It provides some information regarding whether recipients remained
employed, since recipients who lose their job presumably would return to welfare.
14

This analysis is limited to M ≤ 18, since there are only two years of follow-up data and

six months of follow-up data are needed to determine whether a recipient exited welfare.
15

This concern arises since ESPP contractors were paid for each job placement. Thus the

contractors had a strong incentive to make sure that each placement was recorded.
16

Again, this analysis is limited to M ≤ 18, since there are only two years of follow-up

data and six months of follow-up data are needed to determine whether a recipient exited
welfare.
17

In a future study, this identification strategy will be used to estimate the ESPP’s effect

on GA recipients’ homeless shelter use.
18

It is also likely that the ESPP increased earnings, since most selectees were placed in

direct hire jobs and such jobs have been shown to increase earnings and quarters of
employment [Autor and Houseman, 2005].
19

At risk households were defined as those headed by a mother with a minor child as

well as those headed by an uneducated, non-elderly, childless adult.
20

Previous studies have suffered from the same limitation and have projected the

benefits of short-term training programs into the future as well [Friedlander, 1997].
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Table 1
Demographic Characteristics of Members of the Program and Control Group

Demographic
characteristic

All recipients
(1)

Program group
(2)

Control group
(3)

Observations

64,800

6,782

58,018

Male

0.541 (0.002)

0.539 (0.006)

0.541 (0.002)

Age

47.324 (0.034)

48.199 (0.101)

47.221 (0.036)

3.379 (0.012)

3.716 (0.037)

3.340 (0.013)

Race
Asian
Black
Hispanic
White
Not reported

0.012
0.492
0.352
0.095
0.042

(0.000)

0.009
0.478
0.371
0.086
0.050

(0.001)

0.012
0.493
0.349
0.096
0.042

(0.000)

Borough of residence
Bronx
Brooklyn
Manhattan
Queens
Staten Island

0.389
0.309
0.180
0.111
0.007

(0.002)

0.308
0.265
0.289
0.124
0.014

(0.006)

0.399
0.314
0.168
0.110
0.006

(0.002)

Years continuously
on welfare

(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.001)

(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.000)

(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.003)
(0.003)

(0.005)
(0.006)
(0.004)
(0.001)

Standard errors are given in parenthesis.
Bold means are significantly different for the program and control group.

(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.001)

(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.000)

Table 2
Coefficients from Estimating Equation (2) for Select Borough-Wave Pairs
Demographic
characteristic
Male
Age
Years continuously
on welfare

Bronx
3rd wave

Bronx
4th wave

Bronx
12th wave

Brooklyn
3rd wave

Brooklyn Brooklyn Manhattan Manhattan Manhattan Queens
11th wave 16th wave 1st wave 2nd wave 3rd wave 4th wave

Queens
5th wave

Queens
6th wave

-0.0434

0.0592

0.0086

0.1885

-0.1316

0.3983

0.1398

-0.0197

0.0175

0.1497

-0.1053

-0.0159

(0.0632)

(0.0675)

(0.0732)

(0.0755)

(0.0904)

(0.1151)

(0.0700)

(0.0716)

(0.1047)

(0.1195)

(0.1216)

(0.1348)

0.0077

0.0016

0.0177

0.0119

0.0031

0.0083

0.0070

0.0089

0.0109

0.0070

0.0206

0.0182

(0.0037)

(0.0039)

(0.0044)

(0.0046)

(0.0054)

(0.0071)

(0.0044)

(0.0043)

(0.0062)

(0.0069)

(0.0076)

(0.0080)

0.0800

0.0674

-0.0199

0.0438

-0.0573

0.0447

0.1091

0.0789

-0.0099

0.0935

0.0123

-0.0418

(0.0095)

(0.0103)

(0.0123)

(0.0122)

(0.0163)

(0.0170)

(0.0110)

(0.0125)

(0.0201)

(0.0193)

(0.0214)

(0.0265)

-0.0227

-

-

-

-0.1606

-1.5415

-0.5790

-0.6611

0.5272

0.1396

-0.3055

0.2656

(0.5724)

(0.5917)

(0.4508)

(0.4702)

(0.5006)

(0.4093)

(0.4715)

(0.4792)

Race
Asian

(0.4157)

Black
Hispanic
White

-0.0717

-0.0478

0.1155

-0.0862

0.2813

-0.4173

-0.2989

-0.0398

-0.2199

-0.0563

0.0506

0.2926

(0.1324)

(0.1456)

(0.1931)

(0.1551)

(0.2430)

(0.2618)

(0.1325)

(0.1728)

(0.2677)

(0.2828)

(0.3126)

(0.3627)

0.0867

-0.0490

0.2344

-0.0503

0.3712

-0.3528

-0.2489

-0.0200

0.1130

0.0994

0.1166

0.5131

(0.1271)

(0.1420)

(0.1906)

(0.1634)

(0.2516)

(0.2753)

(0.1326)

(0.1734)

(0.2674)

(0.2976)

(0.3280)

(0.3796)

0.2063

-0.1216

-0.0126

-0.3179

0.1867

-0.6867

-0.1420

-0.2260

-0.4293

-0.1750

-0.0310

0.0423

(0.1827)

(0.2156)

(0.2555)

(0.1894)

(0.2652)

(0.2920)

(0.1824)

(0.2211)

(0.3510)

(0.3029)

(0.3296)

(0.3826)

Standard errors are given in parenthesis.
Bold coefficients are significantly different than zero at p < 0.01
Bold Italicized coefficients are significantly different than zero at p < 0.05

Table 3
Coefficients from Estimating Equation (3) using Control Group: 6M restriction
Demographic
characteristic

Eight months (sixteen waves) post selection (M = 8)
(1)
(2)
(3)

PE

0.1310 (0.0078)

0.1348 (0.0077)

0.1309 (0.0081)

Male

-0.0092 (0.0110)

Age
Years continuously
on welfare
Race
Asian
Black
Hispanic
White

0.0823 (0.0125)

0.0823 (0.0129)

-0.0066 (0.0112)

-0.0182 (0.0208)

-0.0147 (0.0208)

-0.0016 (0.0006)

-0.0017 (0.0006)

-0.0042 (0.0011)

-0.0044 (0.0011)

-0.0020 (0.0016)

-0.0024 (0.0017)

0.0015 (0.0034)

-0.0002 (0.0034)

0.0835
0.0096
-0.0051
0.0055

0.0690
0.0007
-0.0042
-0.0165

(0.0661)

-0.0538
0.0159
-0.0090
0.0456

(0.1184)

(0.0673)
(0.0220)
(0.0222)
(0.0263)

Borough of residence
Bronx
Brooklyn
Manhattan
Queens
Wave dummy
Interaction term

No
No

Two years post selection (M = 26)
(4)
(5)
(6)

No
No

Standard errors are given in parenthesis.
Bold coefficients are significantly different than zero at p < 0.01

0.075 (0.01)

0.0566
0.0199
-0.0516
-0.0199

(0.0218)
(0.0220)
(0.0266)

(0.1190)
(0.1220)
(0.1320)

Yes
Yes

No
No

No
No

(0.1083)
(0.0460)
(0.0460)
(0.0540)

0.0393
0.0116
-0.0431
-0.0514

(0.1057)

-0.0764
0.0417
0.0238
0.0233

(0.1650)

(0.0467)
(0.0471)
(0.0547)

(0.1651)
(0.1692)
(0.1807)

Yes
Yes

Figure 1
The Formation of the Program and Control Groups
The program group:
All selectees from the first 17 waves. Specifically it is the union of T1, T2, T3, ….., T17.
The control group:
All non-selectees from the first 17 waves. Specifically it is the union of C1, C2, C3, ….., C171.

T1

1st wave
6,790 recipients were

652 eligible recipients

eligible on 11/3/99

selected on 11/3/99
6,138 eligible recipients
not selected on 11/3/99

C1

T2

2nd wave
6,250 recipients were

619 eligible recipients

eligible on 11/17/99

selected on 11/17/99
5,631 eligible recipients
not selected on 11/17/99

C2
rd

3 wave
5,910 recipients were

905 eligible recipients

eligible on 12/2/99

selected on 12/2/99
5,005 eligible recipients
not selected on 12/2/99

C3
Repeat the process through the 17th wave (on 6/15/2000)

1

Note that many recipients were non-selectees in multiple waves. Consequently, many recipients are
members of the control group multiple times.

T3

Figure 2
The Formation of the Program Group and the Control Group with a One-Wave Restriction on Being Selected
The treatment group:
All selectees from the first 17 waves. Specifically it is the union of T1, T2, T3, ….., T17.
The control Group with a one-wave restriction on being selected
All recipients who were:
1.
2.

non-selectees during any of the first 17 waves and
not selected in the wave subsequent to the one in which they were a non-selectee.

Specifically it is a weighted union of C1a, C1b, C2a, C2b, C3a, C3b, ….., C17a, C17b. The weight placed on each member of each a-series cohort is equal to
one. The weight placed on each member of each b-series cohort is equal to the reciprocal of the probability of not being selected in the subsequent wave,
conditional on being eligible to be selected in that wave, for example, for members of C1b the weight is the reciprocal of (5,248/5,860), or (1/0.896 ) = 1.116.
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T1

C1a
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277 ineligible recipients
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5,631 eligible recipients

5,354 eligible recipients

899 eligible recipients

not selected on 11/17/99

on 12/2/99
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Repeat the process through the 17th wave (on 6/15/2000)
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Figure 3
Estimated effect of ESPP on starting a job using all control groups
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Figure 4
a) Estimated effect of ESPP on starting a job using four least restricted control groups
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b) Estimated effect of ESPP on starting a job using four most restricted control groups
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Figure 5
Estimated effect of ESPP with various covariates included using control groups: 6M and 12M restriction
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Figure 6
Estimated effect of ESPP on starting a job and exiting welfare using all control groups
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Figure 7
Estimated effect of ESPP on exiting welfare using all control groups
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